Moving Target Defense (MTD) can enhance the resilience of cyber systems against attacks. Although there have been many MTD techniques, there is no systematic understanding and quantitative characterization of the power of MTD. In this paper, we propose to use a cyber epidemic dynamics approach to characterize the power of MTD. We define and investigate two complementary measures that are applicable when the defender aims to deploy MTD to achieve a certain security goal. One measure emphasizes the maximum portion of time during which the system can afford to stay in an undesired configuration (or posture), without considering the cost of deploying MTD. The other measure emphasizes the minimum cost of deploying MTD, while accommodating that the system has to stay in an undesired configuration (or posture) for a given portion of time. Our analytic studies lead to algorithms for optimally deploying MTD.
INTRODUCTION
Moving Target Defense (MTD) is believed to be a "game changer" for cyber defense. Although there have been many studies on specific MTD techniques, the power of MTD is often demonstrated via simulation. Rigorously characterizing the power of MTD is an important problem and is closely related to the well known hard problem of security metrics. In this paper, we initiate the study of a novel approach for characterizing the power of MTD.
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Our Contributions
We propose to use the cyber epidemic dynamics approach to characterize the power of classes of MTD techniques. We define and investigate two novel and complementary security measures that are applicable when using MTD to achieve a certain defense goal. The first measure is centered on the maximum portion of time (in the equilibrium) during which the system can afford to stay in an undesired/insecure configuration (or posture), without considering the cost of deploying MTD. The second measure is centered on the minimum cost when the system has to stay in an undesired/insecure configuration (or posture) for a predetermined portion of time. Our analytic studies lead to algorithms for deploying MTD in such optimal fashions. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic study on characterizing the power of classes of MTD techniques.
The Science
Rigorously characterizing the power of MTD (or any defense) would be a core problem in the science of security. Indeed, the present study initiates a paradigm for measuring the power of MTD (or other kinds of defense techniques whose deployment can make a global difference). The paradigm is centered on measuring the degree of undersired/insecure configurations that can be tolerated by deploying advanced defense such as MTD. The specific criterion used in the present paper, namely that the attacks are eventually wiped out in a certain sense, can be substituted by other criteria. One possible candidate is the containment of malware infections to a certain tolerable level [50] (e.g., by appropriately choosing threshold cryptosystems).
Related Work
The present paper does not introduce any new MTD technique. Rather, it studies how to systematically characterize the power of MTD and optimally launch MTD. Existing studies for a similar purpose are often based on simulation [1, 2, 27, 21] . There is effort at analytically evaluating the power of some specific MTD techniques from a localized view [31, 54] ; in contrast, we characterize the power of classes of MTD techniques from a global view.
Cyber epidemic dynamics was rooted in biological epidemic dynamics [33, 26] . The first cyber epidemic models [24, 25] were limited by their homogeneity assumption that each computer/node has the same effect on the others. Recently, models that are more appropriate for studying cyber security problems have been proposed [37, 45, 10, 15, 44, 51, 52, 50] . As we will elaborate later, the basic idea underlying these models is to use a graph-theoretic abstraction to represent the attack-defense structure, and use parameters to represent attack and defense capabilities. Cyber epidemic dynamics is a special kind of cybersecurity dynamics [49] ,
We will use the cyber epidemic dynamics model in [50] as the starting point of our study. This model [50] describes reactive adaptive defense (i.e., the defender aims to adjust its defense to control/contain the global security state). We extend this model to accommodate MTD, a kind of proactive defense, and the resulting model is analyzed using different skills [29, 32] . We mention that the effect of dynamic structures in cyber epidemic models is studied in [38] , where the structure dynamics however follows a deterministic and periodic process, rather than adaptively scheduled by using (for example) MTD. We also mention that the effect of dynamic semi-heterogeneous structures (i.e., clustered networks), rather than arbitrary heterogeneous structures, is studied in [39] . These studies [38, 39] consider static parameters only and do not have any of the measures we propose to use. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a classification of MTD techniques and describe a cyber epidemic dynamics model that can accommodate MTD. In Section 3, we characterize the power of MTD that induces dynamic parameters. In Section 4, we characterize the power of MTD that induces dynamic attack-defense structures. We discuss the limitations of the present study in Section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
CYBER EPIDEMIC DYNAMICS MODEL ACCOMMODATING MTD

Three Classes of MTD Techniques
As mentioned in Section 1.3 and elaborated later, cyber epidemic dynamics models use a graph-theoretic abstraction to represent the attack-defense structure, and use parameters to represent attack and defense capabilities. This suggests us to classify MTD techniques based on what they will induce changes to the attack-defense structure and/or parameters.
Networks-based MTD Techniques (Class I)
Example techniques that fall into this class are IP address (and TCP port) randomization and dynamic access control. The basic idea underlying IP address and TCP port randomization is to frequently shuffle the IP addresses of computers by using various methods. One method is to use virtual machine techniques, such as migrating ensembles of virtual machines [23] and others [48, 53] . Another method is to use networking techniques, such as Network Address Space Randomization (NASR) whereby IP addresses can be dynamically assigned (in lieu of DHCP) to render the attacker's hitlist useless [1] , IP hopping [2] and others [27] . A recent variant considers constraints and how to minimize the operation cost [21] .
The basic idea underlying dynamic access control is to dynamically regulate which computers or which network address space can directly have access to the services in which other network address space. For example, certain servers on a campus network only accommodate service requests from certain classrooms. By dynamically randomizing IP addresses of authorized computers (e.g., using aforementioned techniques), some compromised computers cannot launch direct attacks against some target computers.
Hosts-based MTD Techniques (Class II)
Four kinds of techniques fall into this class: instruction-level, codelevel, memory-level, and application-level. One instruction-level technique is called Instruction Set Randomization (ISR), which aims to randomize the instructions of each process so that the attacker cannot inject executable malicious code [22, 5] . ISR uses a programspecific key to encrypt the instructions of a program and the processor uses the same key to decrypt and run the instructions, where encryption is often based on binary transformation tools, and decryption is often based on dynamic binary instrumentation tools [5, 4] , emulators [22, 7] , or architectural support [35, 41, 47] .
One code-level technique is code randomization [11, 14] . Code randomization offers fine-grained protection against code reuse attacks by substituting/reordering instructions, inserting NOPs, and re-allocating registers. Code randomization operations can be conducted at the compiler [16, 20] or virtual machine level [18] , or via static binary rewriting [36, 46] and runtime binary rewriting [8, 28, 30, 34] . Dynamically generated code also can be randomized [19] .
One memory-level technique is called Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), which defeats code-injection attacks by randomizing the memory layout of a program (e.g., stack) either at the compile time or at the runtime [42] . ASLR can protect an executable (including the associated static data, stack, heap and dynamic libraries) [6] and the operating system kernel [16] , but cannot defeat code reuse attacks.
One application-level technique is called N -version programming [3] , by which the defender can dynamically use different implementations of the same program function. Another technique is called proactive cryptography. Cryptographic properties proven in abstract models are undermined by attacks (e.g., malware) that can compromise cryptographic keys. Threshold cryptography can avoid this single-point-of-failure because it "split" a key into m pieces such that compromising fewer than t pieces will not cause exposure of the key, while the cryptographic function can be computed when any t of the m pieces participate [40, 12] . Proactive cryptography can render the compromised pieces of a key useless once the pieces are re-shuffled [17] .
Instruments-based MTD Techniques (Class III)
The defender can utilize honeypot-like techniques to capture new attacks. Since the attacker can "tomograph" honeypots and bypass the IP addresses monitored by them, the defender needs to dynamically change the IP addresses monitored by honeypots [9] .
Cyber Epidemic Dynamics Model Accommodating MTD Cyber Epidemic Dynamics Models
The basic idea underlying cyber epidemic dynamics models (see, for example, [45, 10, 15, 44, 52, 51, 50] ) can be explained as follows. Cyber attacks are often launched from compromised computers against vulnerable computers. This means that there exists an (attacker, victim) relation, which captures that an attacker (e.g., compromised computer) can directly attack a victim (e.g., vulnerable) computer. In the extreme case where any computer can attack any other computer, this relation induces a complete graph structure. In general, any graph structure can be relevant. The resulting graph structures are called attack-defense structures, where compromised computers/nodes may be detected and cured, but may later get attacked again. Such models can naturally abstract attack and defense capabilities as parameters that are associated to the nodes and edges of attack-defense structures. A core concept in cyber epidemic dynamics models is the so-called epidemic threshold, namely a sufficient condition under which the epidemic dynamics converges to the clean state.
Accommodating MTD
We adapt the cyber epidemic dynamics model introduced in [50] , which considers reactive adaptive defense, to accommodate MTD (i.e., proactive defense). Specifically, the afore-discussed Class I MTD techniques can be accommodated with dynamic attackdefense structures, because they can cause that an infected computer may be able to attack a vulnerable computer at time t1 but not at time t2 > t1 (e.g., the vulnerable computer's IP address has been changed). Class II MTD techniques can be accommodated with dynamic parameters because they can affect capabilities of attacker and defender over time. Class III MTD techniques can be accommodated with dynamic attack-defense structures (because an IP address assigned to honeypot at time t1 may be reassigned to a production computer at time t2 > t1) and dynamic parameters (because the defender could learn zero-day attacks from honeypot-captured data, and identify and disseminate countermeasures to prevent/detect such attacks). As such, our characterization study can accommodate the three classes of MTD techniques. Specifically, we consider a cyber epidemic dynamics model with dynamic attack-defense structure G(t) = (V, E(t)), where V is the set of nodes (e.g., computers) and E(t) is the set of edges at time t such that (w, v) ∈ E(t) means that node w can attack node v at time t. Note that G(t) reflects the dynamic attack-defense structure imposed by MTD. Suppose |V | = n. We may think V = {1, . . . , n} as well. Let A(t) = [Avu(t)] denote the adjacency matrix of G(t), where Avu(t) = 1 if (u, v) ∈ E(t) and Avu(t) = 0 otherwise. Naturally, we have Auu(t) = 0 for all u ∈ V (i.e., a computer does not attack itself). Suppose any node v ∈ V has two possible states: secure or infected. A node v ∈ V is secure if it is vulnerable but not successfully attacked yet, and infected if it is successfully attacked. Let iv(t) and sv(t) respectively be the probabilities that v ∈ V is infected and secure at time t, where iv(t) + sv(t) = 1.
Let γ(t) be the probability that at time t, an infected node u ∈ V successfully attacks a secure node v ∈ V over (u, v) ∈ E(t). Note that γ(t) reflects the local capability of preventive defense (if deployed) and MTD. Let β(t) be the probability that an infected node v ∈ V becomes secure at time t. Note that β(t) reflects the local capability of reactive defense (if deployed) and MTD. Suppose the attacks are independently launched. The probability that a secure node v ∈ V becomes infected at time t is [50] :
The master dynamics equation is [50] :
This is the starting point of our study. Table 1 lists the main notations used in the paper.
Measuring the Power of MTD
Let I * = (0, . . . , 0) denote the clean state or equilibrium i * v def = limt→∞ iv(t) = 0 for all v ∈ V , namely that there are no infected computers in the equilibrium (i.e., the spreading dies out). Cyber epidemic threshold is a sufficient condition under which the dynamics converges to I * = (0, . . . , 0). In the special case that G = (V, E) and (β, γ) are independent of t, it is known [10, 15, 44, 51] that the dynamics converges to I * = (0, . . . , 0) if
where λ1(A) is the largest (in modulus) eigenvalue of the adjacent matrix A of G. If μ < 0, the dynamics does not converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0) at least for some initial values.
Suppose the defender is confronted with configuration or posture C1 = (G1 = (V, E1), β1, γ1), under which condition (1) does Table 1 : Main notations used throughout the paper X(t), X X(t) is a function of time t, while X is not G(t) G(t) = (V, E(t)) is attack-defense structure at time t: a graph of node set V and edge set E(t), where |V | = n A(t) adjacency matrix of G(t) = (V, E(t)) sv(t), iv(t) the probability that node v ∈ V is secure or infected at time t, respectively i * v the probability that node v ∈ V is infected as t → ∞ (if existing)
where n = |V | β(t) the cure probability that an infected node becomes secure at time t (i.e., reflecting the local capability of reactive and MTD defense) γ(t) the infection probability that infected node u successfully attacks secure node v over edge (u, v) ∈ E(t), reflecting the local capability of preventive and MTD defense C(t) C(t) = (G(t), β(t), γ(t)) is system configuration or posture at time t C1 C1 = (G1, β1, γ1) is the undesired configuration that violates the convergence condition Cj Cj = (Gj, βj , γj) for j ≥ 2 are MTD-induced desired configurations that satisfy the convergence condition λ1(A) the largest eigenvalue (in modulus) of matrix A In the n-dimensional identity matrix · the 2-norm of vector or matrix s ←R S select s as a random element of set S T ← exp(a) assign T a value according to the exponential distribution with parameter a not hold. Suppose the defender can launch combinations of MTD techniques to induce configurations Cj = (Gj = (V, Ej), βj, γj) for j ≥ 2, each of which satisfies condition (1) . If the defender can always assure (G(t), β(t), γ(t)) = Cj = (Gj , βj , γj) for any t > 0 and some j ≥ 2, the problem is solved because the defender can make the dynamics converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0) by launching MTD to induce Cj. However, it would be more realistic that the defender can maintain such configurations as Cj (j ≥ 2) for a small period of time, because the attacker can introduce (for example) zero-day attacks to force the system to depart from configuration Cj and enter configuration C1. Moreover, the system may have to stay in configuration C1 at least for some period of time because G1 = (V, E1) is necessary for facilitating some applications. Figure 1 illustrates the idea of using MTD to make the overall dynamics converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0), while allowing the system to stay for some portion of time in the undesired configuration C1, which violates condition (1).
The preceding discussion leads us to define two measures of power of MTD. The first definition captures the maximum time the system can afford to stay in the undesired configuration C1 while the overall dynamics converges to I * = (0, . . . , 0) because of MTD, without considering cost. DEFINITION 1. (power of MTD without considering cost) Consider undesired configuration C1 = (G1, β1, γ1) that violates condition (1) . Suppose the defender can launch MTD to induce configurations Cj = (Gj, βj , γj) for j ∈ [2, . . . , J], where each Cj satisfies condition (1) . Denote by The second definition captures the minimum cost with respect to a given portion of time, π1, during which the system must stay in configuration C1.
DEFINITION 2. (power of MTD while considering cost)
Consider undesired configuration C1 = (G1, β1, γ1) that violates condition (1) , and the potion of time π1 that the system must stay in configuration C1. Suppose the defender can launch MTD to induce configurations Cj = (Gj , βj , γj) for j = 2, . . . , J, where each Cj satisfies condition (1) . Denote by μj = βj − γj λ1(Aj) for j = 2, . . . , J, where Aj is the adjacency matrix of Gj. Consider cost function h(·) : . Nevertheless, all of our results allow to explicitly compute π * 2 , · · · , π * N . Definition 2 explicitly mentions π * 2 , . . . , π * J because they are essential to the definition of minimum cost, where π1 is not a parameter of the cost Υ because the system must stay in C1 for a predetermined portion of time π1.
POWER OF MTD INDUCING DYNAMIC PARAMETERS
In this section we characterize the power of MTD that induces dynamic parameters but keeps the attack-defense structure intact (i.e., G is independent of time t throughout this section). Let A be the adjacency matrix of G. We first recall the following theorem from [50] and present a corollary of it. THEOREM 1. ( [50] ) Consider configurations (G, β(t), γ(t)), where the dynamic parameters β(t) and γ(t) are driven by some ergodic stochastic process. Let E(β(0)) and E(γ(0)) be the respective expectations of the stationary distributions of the process. Suppose convergences limt→∞ 0)) are uniform with respect to t0 almost surely. If E(β(0))/E(γ(0)) > λ1(A), the dynamics converges to I * = (0, . . . , 0) almost surely; if E(β(0))/E(γ(0)) < λ1(A), there might exist infected nodes in the equilibrium. COROLLARY 1. Consider configurations (G, β(t), γ(t)), where (β(t), γ(t)) are driven by a homogeneous Markov process ηt with steady-state distribution [π1, · · · , πN ] and support {(β1, γ1), . . . , (βN , γN )}, meaning E(βη t ) = π1β1 +· · ·+πN βN and E(γη t ) = π1γ1 + · · · + πN γN . If
the dynamics will converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0); if
the dynamics will not converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0) at least for some initial value scenarios.
Characterizing Power of MTD without Considering Cost
In this case, despite that C1 = (G, β1, γ1) violates condition (1), the system needs to stay as much as possible in configuration C1. Fortunately, the defender can exploit MTD to make the overall dynamics converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0). This is possible because MTD can induce configurations Cj = (G, βj , γj) for j = 2, . . . , N, where each Cj satisfies condition (1) . Denote by μj = βj − γjλ1(A) for j = 1, · · · , N. Without loss of generality, suppose μ1 < 0 < μ2 < · · · < μN . According to Corollary 1, if
then the dynamics will converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0). Since inequality (3) is strict and is a linear function of π1, in order to reach the maximum π * 1 we need to introduce a sufficiently small constant 0 < δ 1 and replace condition (3) with
Theorem 2 constructively identifies the maximum π * 1 , the maximal portion of time the system can afford to stay in C1. THEOREM 2. Suppose configuration C1 = (G, β1, γ1) violates condition (1) . Suppose MTD-induced configurations Cj = (G, βj , γj) for j = 2, · · · , N satisfy condition (1) as 0 < μ2 < · · · < μN . The maximal potion of time the system can afford to stay in configuration C1 is
while the system will stay in configurations C2, . . . , CN respectively with portions of time given by
In other words, MTD is
Moreover, this maximum π * 1 can be reached if all the equalities in Eqs. (6) and (7) hold, namely
This means that the defender only needs to launch the MTD that induces configuration CN = (G, βN , γN ).
Theorem 2 says that although the defender can launch MTD to induce a set of (N − 1) configurations, C2, . . . , CN with 0 < μ2 < · · · < μN , only CN matters. This means that μ k is indicative of the capability of a configuration. Figure 2 
Characterizing Power of MTD while Considering Cost
In this case, configuration C1 = (G, β1, γ1) is given and the time the system must stay in C1 is predetermined as π1. The defender wants to deploy MTD to make the overall dynamics converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0), while minimizing the cost of launching MTD. Denote the MTD-induced configurations by Cj = (G, βj , γj ) for 2 ≤ j ≤ N . Note that cost may only be considered for N ≥ 3 because when N = 2, it is more meaningful to maximize π * 1 (i.e., the preceding case).
Since we have proved that π1 ≤ π *
is necessary to make the dynamics converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0),
is the natural upper bound on π1 (i.e., if π1 is above the upper bound, we cannot assure the dynamics will converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0), regardless of the cost). Consider cost function f (·) : R + → R + as in Definition 2. such that f (μj ) is the cost of launching MTD to induce configuration Cj for 2 ≤ j ≤ N , where f (μ) ≥ 0 for μ > 0. The objective is to minimize, for given cost function f (·) and any constant f (μ1), the following cost:
Since the objective is linear and the optimal solution would get on bound of the non-closed constraint (10), we need to introduce a sufficiently small constant 0 < δ 1 and replace constraint (10) with
Theorem 3 shows how to find the minimum cost Φ(π * 2 , · · · , π * N ) according to constraints (8) and (11), and therefore gives an algorithm for the optimization problem. Proof of Theorem 3 is deferred to the Appendix. THEOREM 3. Suppose configuration C1 = (G, β1, γ1) violates condition (1) . Suppose MTD-induced configurations Cj = (G, βj , γj) for j = 2, · · · , N satisfy condition (1) . Suppose π1, where 0 < π1
, is the potion of time the system must stay in C1. Suppose f (·) is the cost function as discussed above. Define
and for 2 ≤ l < m ≤ N ,
If k * = 2, the minimal cost under constraint (11) is
which is reached by launching MTD to induce configuration C2 only. If k * > 2, the minimal cost under constraint (11) is
Denote by {μ l * , μm * } = arg min 
where 0 < δ 1 is some constant. That is, MTD is (μ1, μ2, · · · , μN , π1, Φ)-powerful.
Algorithm for Orchestrating Optimal MTD
When not considering cost, Theorem 2 constructively gives a method for optimally launching MTD. When considering arbitrary cost function f (·), Theorem 3 constructively shows how to find the minimum cost Φ(π (11), and therefore gives a method for computing the minimum cost and the corresponding strategy for optimally launching MTD. Theorems 2-3 suggest many possible ways/algorithms to achieve the goal, with Algorithm 1 being a concrete example.
Algorithm 1 Launching optimal MTD (dynamic parameters)
INPUT: initial configuration C1 = (G, β1, γ1), MTD-induced configurations Cj = (G, βj , γj ) for j = 2, · · · , N and N ≥ 2, constant a > 0 determining time resolution, optional cost function f (·), δ (0 < δ << 1), optional π1 OUTPUT: Optimal Specifically, lines 2-7 describe the algorithm corresponding to Theorem 2 (i.e., not considering cost), where line 4 instructs the defender not to launch MTD so that the system stays in configuration C1 for a period of time T1, and line 5 instructs the defender to launch MTD to make the system stay in configuration CN for the period of time TN . On the other hand, lines 9-26 describe the algorithm corresponding to Theorem 3 (i.e., considering cost). If k * = 2, the defender needs to make the cyber system stay alternatively in configurations C1 and C2. If k * > 2, the defender needs to make the cyber system stay alternatively in configurations C1 for a period of time T1, in configuration C l * for a period of time T l * and/or in configuration Cm * for a period of time Tm * . Depending on the random coins flipped on lines 21 and 24, possible configuration sequences include: C1, C l * , Cm * , C1, . . . and C1, C l * , Cm * , C l * , C1, . . .. Another algorithm for achieving the same goal it to make the system in C1, C l * , Cm * , C1, C l * , Cm * , . . . periodically for periods of time T1, T l * , Tm * , respectively.
The computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is straightforward. When not considering cost, the algorithm incurs O(1) computational complexity. When considering cost, line 9 incurs O(N ) complexity for searching k * according to (12) , line 11 incurs O(N 2 ) complexity for searching the optimal l * and m * according to (13) , and all other steps incur O(1) complexity.
Simpler Algorithm for Convex and Concave Cost Functions
Algorithm 1 applies to arbitrary cost function f (·). We make a further observation on Theorem 3, which says that for any given
and cost function f (·), if k * = 2, the minimum cost is reached by inducing configuration C2; if k * > 2, Eqs. (13) and (14) indicate that the minimum cost is dependent upon the property of f (·). Now we show that when f (·) is convex or concave, which may hold for most scenarios, we can obtain closed-form results on l * , m * , and therefore Algorithm 1 is naturally simplified. Recall that μ2 < · · · < μN . Define R(μ l , μm) =
. It can be verified that
Having identified μ k * −1 , μ k * , one can compute π k * −1 , π k * according to (15) . Thus, lines 11 and 12 are simplified by this analytical result, with the complexity of searching for the optimal solution (i.e., k * in this case) reduced to O(N ).
• If f (·) is concave, namely f (·) ≤ 0, then for fixed μ l (or μm), R(μ l , μm) is monotonically non-increasing (or nondecreasing) in μm (or μm). The minimum cost is
Similarly, having identified μ2, μN , one can compute π2, πN according to (15) . Thus, lines 11 and 12 are simplified by this analytical result, with the complexity of searching for the optimal solution reduced to O(1).
The above discussion suggests the following: If f (·) is convex, the defender only needs to launch MTD to induce configurations . We set π * 1 = 3 5 , which means k * = 4. Figure 3 plots the total cost Φ with different cost functions f (·), where π4 = 1 − π1 − π2 − π3. The shadow area in the π2π3-plane is the constrain slope of π2, π3 with respect to condition (11) . Note that Φ = π * 1 f (μ1)+π2f (μ2)+π3f (μ3)+(1− π * 1 − π2 − π3)f (μ4), which is linear non-increasing in π2 for fixed π3 (also in π3 for fixed π2). 
POWER OF MTD INDUCING DYNAMIC STRUCTURES
In this section, we characterize the power of MTD that induces dynamic attack-defense structures G(t), while the parameters (β, γ) are kept intact. More specifically, suppose configuration C1 = (G1, β, γ) violates condition (1). Suppose MTD-induced configurations C l = (G l , β, γ) for l = 2, · · · , N and N ≥ 2 satisfy condition (1). We want to identify a Markov process strategy σt, defined over C1, C2, . . . , C N , to make the dynamics converge to equilibrium I * = (0, . . . , 0), while staying in configuration C1 as much as possible or minimizing the cost of launching MTD. Throughout this section, let A l be the adjacency matrix of G l for l = 2, . . . , N .
We start with a general result where one or more configurations violating condition (1).
Then, the overall dynamics converges to I * = (0, . . . , 0) almost surely under Markov process strategy σt with infinitesimal generator Q = (quv) N ×N defined as:
for all p = r and p, r ∈ {1, . . . , N }.
PROOF. Suppose (if needed, with reordering)
For any k > j, [γA k −βIn] is a Hurwitz matrix [43] (i.e., real parts of all eigenvalues are negative), meaning that there exist positive definite matrices P k < In and a constant 0 < δ 1 such that
We can find positive definite matrices P with ≤ j and positive constants a < 1 < b < c such that aIn < P k < In < bIn < P < cIn, ∀k > j, ≤ j, and
By combining (i)-(iii) in the condition of the theorem, we obtain
Since the parameters are static and the structures are driven by Markov process σt, the dynamics of iv(t) for v ∈ V is:
Since
always holds, we define a new variable yv(t) with dynamics:
Note that any sample point w ∈ Ω corresponds to a deterministic σt(w). Let
be the solutions of systems (20) and (21) under the Markov switching process σt(w) respectively. From the comparison theory of differential equations, we know i(t) ≤ y(t) holds if i(0) = y(0),
Let V (y(t), t, σt) =
. The joint process {(y(t), σt) : t > 0} is a strong Markov process and the infinitesimal generator of the process is:
From the Dynkin Formula [13] and Eq. (19), we have
qr,σ τ P (r)y(τ )dτ
Hence, we have
which implies that i(t) converges to zero almost surely for all v. This completes the proof.
Characterizing Power of MTD without Considering Cost
THEOREM 5. Suppose configuration C1 = (G1, β, γ) violates condition (1) and MTD-induced configurations C l = (G l , β, γ) for l = 2, . . . , N satisfy condition (1) . Denote by μ l = β − γλ1(Aj) for l = 1, . . . , N . Without loss of generality, suppose μ1 < 0 < μ2 < · · · < μ N . Under the definition of Q in Theorem 4, the maximum portion of time the system can afford to stay in configuration C1 is
which is reached by launching MTD to induce configuration (G N , β, γ).
That is, MTD is (μ1, · · · , μ N , π * 1 )-powerful. PROOF. The infinitesimal generator Q defined in the proof of Theorem 4 specifies the desired law σt, which can guide the deployment of MTD to force the overall dynamics converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0). Note that j in Eq. (18) represents the number of configurations that violate condition (1) . Hence, j = 1 in the present scenario. For each r ∈ {1, . . . , N }, let xr = Consider configurations {C1, C k 1 , · · · , C km }, where m ≤ N , and C k l = (G k l , β, γ) for l ∈ {1, · · · , m} and {k1, . . . , km} ⊆ {2, · · · , N } (which will be determined below) are MTD-induced configurations. Under the definition of Q in Theorem 4, we have
This means that the dynamics converges to I * = (0, . . . , 0), while staying in configuration C1 for a portion of time π1, where
. We see that the maximum π1, namely π * 1 , is reached when {G k 1 , . . . , G km } = {G N }. This completes the proof.
Theorem 5 further confirms that μ is indicative of the capability of a configuration in terms of "forcing" the overall dynamics to converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0). Eq. (22) says that π * 1 is monotonically increasing in μ N for fixed μ1 and decreasing in μ1 for fixed μ N . Remark. In Theorem 5 we consider a single configuration C1 that violates condition (1). We can extend Theorem 5 to accommodate multiple configurations that violate condition (1), because Theorem 4 can accommodate this scenario. However, if the goal is to maximize the time that the system can stay in the configurations that violate condition (1), the optimal solution is with respect to configuration Cj, where j is given by Eq. (18) , such that the system will stay in Cj for the maximum portion of time π * 1 given by Theorem 5.
Characterizing Power of MTD while Considering Cost
The goal is to make the dynamics converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0), at minimum cost of launching MTD, while the system stays a predetermined π1 portion of time in C1. The preceding case proved
is necessary to make the dynamics converge to I * = (0, . . . , 0). Let μ l = β − γλ1(A l ) for l = 1, . . . , N . Let the cost function g(·): R + → R + be the same as discussed in Definition 2, namely that g(μ l ) is the cost of launching MTD to induce C l for l = 2, . . . , N , where g (μ) ≥ 0 for μ > 0.
Let σt be the desired "law" for deploying MTD, and denote by Q = [q jk ] its infinitesimal generator. Let x l = 1 −q ll , where
is the expectation of sojourn time in configuration C l . Then, the portion of time in C l is π l = x l N l=1
x l . Our goal is to find the "law" under which the cost is minimum. Theorem 4 specifies the desired Markov "law" σt via its infinitesimal generator. Now we consider cost function Ψ(x) with respect to x = [x1, · · · , x N ].
Let G k l for l = 1, . . . , m and m ≥ 1 be the MTD-induced configurations, namely
Under the the definition of Q in Theorem 4, σt needs to satisfy:
x1,
Note that
are respectively the portions of time in configurations C1 and C k l . Definē
the maximum portion of time the system can stay in C1 when MTD induces the m configurations. For any π1 such that π1 >π1 does not hold, π1 cannot be realized by a underlying Markov process. Therefore, we assume that π * 1 <π1. Denote the index set corresponding to Eq. (24) as
For {k1, · · · , k m } ∈ K, we need to find the "law" σt that satisfies (23) . From π1 =
The cost of launching MTD according to "law" σt is:
We want to compute the minimize cost
THEOREM 6. Given configuration C1 that violates condition (1) and MTD-induced configurations C l for l = 2, . . . , N that satisfy condition (1) . Suppose π1, where 0 < π1
, is the portion of time that the system must stay in C1. Denote by
We want to find {k *
For given cost function g(·) with arbitrary constant g(μ1), the minimum cost is
which is reached by launching MTD to induce configuration
via the following deployment strategy:
Hence, MTD is (μ1, . . . , μ N , π1, Ψ)-powerful.
PROOF. Suppose {k1, · · · , k m } ∈ K. We introduce variables ζ
x k l and translate the minimum problem specified by (25) - (26) into the following minimum problem:
We study the Lagrange function
Find all stationary points {x, ζ, α} of Λ1, with gradient ∇Λ1 = 0. where e l is the vector whose l-th element equals 1 and any other element equals 0. By comparing the costs of these stationary points, we find the minimum cost of launching these configurations is π1g(μ1) + (1 − π1)G(k1, · · · , k m ).
This complete the proof.
Remark. Similar to Theorem 5, in Theorem 6 we consider a single configuration C1 that violates condition (1). We also can extend Theorem 6 to accommodate multiple configurations that violate condition (1), because Theorem 4 can accommodate this scenario. The extension is straightforward because the portions of time that are allocated to the violating configurations are fixed and not involved in the definition of cost.
Algorithm for Orchestrating Optimal MTD
Theorems 5 and 6 are constructive and lead to Algorithm 2 that can guide the deployment of optimal MTD. Wait for time T1 ← exp(a/π1) {system in C1} 12:
while TRUE do 14:
Launch MTD to make the system stay in C k * 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
First, the present study assumes that the attack-defense structures and parameters are given. It is sufficient for characterizing the power of MTD. Nevertheless, it is important to study how to obtain such structures and parameters.
Second, the present study does not allow the attacker to choose when to impose configuration C1. It is important to give the attack the freedom in choosing when to impose C1. This incurs technical difficulties. For example, the portion of time in the violating configuration may not be fixed at π1, which breaks the setting of the optimization problem.
Third, it is interesting to extend the model to accommodate heterogeneous γ(v, u) and β(v). However, this will make the model difficult to analyze mainly because of accommodating β(v).
CONCLUSION
We have introduced an approach of using cyber epidemic dynamics to characterize the power of MTD. The approach offers algorithms for optimally deploying MTD, where "optimization" means maximizing the portion of time the system can afford to stay in an undesired configuration, or minimizing the cost of launching MTD when the system has to stay in an undesired configuration for a predetermined portion of time. We have discussed the limitations of the present study, which should inspire fruitful future research.
